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Abstract 
 
 
National policy responses to the euro crisis and political difficulties in their implementation 
have varied considerably across the peripheral Eurozone member states. This paper argues 
that when countries are faced with balance-of-payments crises such as the euro crisis, 
variation in societies’ vulnerabilities to austerity and structural reforms, relative to the 
alternative of devaluation can explains these differences. It argues that political difficulties, 
delayed and mixed adjustment strategies, and use of external help are particularly likely when 
the economy is vulnerable to any policy adjustment. In contrast, decisive adjustment is more 
feasible and political difficulties much less pronounced when one type of vulnerability 
dominates both among the country as a whole and the government’s core constituency. 
Irrespective of the vulnerability profile and the policy response chosen, however, the 
government always tries to shelter its own core constituency as much as possible from the 
negative consequences of the crisis. Empirically, the paper evaluates this argument by 
analyzing variation in crisis responses, crisis politics, and distributive outcomes to the global 
financial crisis of 2007-10 in eight Eastern European countries, including the Baltic states and 
Bulgaria, which successfully implemented internal devaluation. The paper concludes by 
comparing the vulnerability profiles and crisis politics in the peripheral Eurozone member 
states with those of the Eastern European countries.  
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What explains variation in the success of the peripheral Eurozone member states in 
their fight against the euro crisis? Some countries have successfully implemented drastic and 
painful domestic reforms, whereas others have experienced significant political opposition to 
their crisis management and have made more limited progress in resolving the underlying 
problems in their economies. Ireland, for example, has implemented far-reaching reforms and 
successfully concluded the financial assistance program in December 2013. In contrast, crisis 
politics has been highly contentious in Greece, where the implementation of the conditions 
attached to two sizeable bailout packages has been politically difficult, adjustment has mainly 
occurred through an implosion of domestic demand, and which has seen the emergence of 
strong radical parties on the right and the left of the political spectrum. 
Existing research leaves us less puzzled by the political problems experienced by 
Greek policymakers than by the Irish success. Most research on the politics of adjustment 
emphasizes the difficulties associated with implementing painful and far-reaching domestic 
reforms, so-called internal adjustment (Nelson 1990). Some work even implies that these 
difficulties are so large that democratic policymakers usually adjust through a devaluation of 
the currency rather than push through far-reaching internal reforms (Eichengreen 1992; 
Simmons 1994; Bearce and Hallerberg 2011). It is therefore not surprising that virtually no 
democratic country has successfully overcome balance-of-payments crises without devaluing 
its currency. This picture has changed only recently with the global financial and economic 
crisis in 2007, which hit the Eastern European economies particularly hard. These countries 
had accumulated substantial current account deficits in the pre-crisis boom years, resulting in 
significant imbalances and need for substantial adjustment. To the surprise of many 
observers, 1  four of these democracies – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – 
successfully rebalanced their economies through painful domestic reforms rather than a 
devaluation of their currencies.  
These four successful episodes show that internal adjustment can be a feasible 
adjustment strategy for democratic countries experiencing balance-of-payments pressures. 
This is good news for those member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU) that 
accumulated large current account deficits in the first decade after the euro’s inception. EMU 
members have ruled out the option of external adjustment by design.2 Nonetheless, the Baltic 
and Bulgarian success stories, and the political difficulties faced by most EMU member states 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example (IMF 2012). 
2 The option still exists, but implies an exit from the eurozone which legally also requires exit from the 
European Union. 
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in replicating this success raise the question of when internal adjustment can turn into a viable 
option for democratic policymakers, despite the high economic, social, and political costs 
associated with this adjustment strategy. 
To answer this question, this paper first explores theoretically why policymakers 
respond differently to balance-of-payments problems and why crisis management is more 
controversial and politically difficult in some countries than in others. It argues that this 
variation is related to the vulnerability profiles of large parts of society. If one adjustment path 
clearly imposes more costs than the alternative, the government pursues the alternative. 
Adjustment occurs relatively swiftly, with limited political turmoil and with attenuated costs 
for the government’s core supporters. In contrast, countries where any policy adjustment is 
likely to be very costly will experience political conflict and policymakers will tend to delay 
adjustment and mix elements of external and internal strategies. In this case, adjustment is 
politically difficult, even if the government will strive to shelter its core constituency from the 
worst consequences of the crisis.  
Empirically, the paper illustrates the argument by analyzing the variation in crisis 
responses, crisis politics, and distributive outcomes to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-10 
in the eight Eastern European EU member states that had not yet adopted the euro at the time 
of the crisis. It shows that variation in vulnerability profiles is related to variation in policy 
responses, the use of (external) financing, and the level of political conflict in these countries. 
However, despite significant differences in adjustment strategies and crisis politics, the 
evidence suggests that in each country studied, the government’s core constituency 
systematically emerged as the group less harmed by the crisis than opposition voters or non-
voters. This suggests that policymakers not only take the country’s overall situation into 
account, but design crisis policies with special attention to the needs and vulnerabilities of 
their core voters. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Eastern 
European experience for the eurozone member states.  
 
1. Argument 
Why do some governments undertake significant reforms when faced with balance-of-
payments difficulties, while other governments seem paralyzed? Why do some implement far-
reaching structural reforms while others rely more on an implosion of domestic demand? 
Why do some governments meet fierce resistance to their crisis management, while others can 
build on broad political and public consensus that reforms are needed? And how does the 
government’s fight against such a crisis affect the well-being of different societal groups? I 
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argue that the answer to these questions is rooted in variation in countries’ and constituencies’ 
vulnerabilities to different types of crisis responses.  
Balance of payments problems emerge when a country runs a current account deficit 
and the private capital inflows that have been financing this deficit dry up. There are three 
ways to address such problems. Countries can continue to finance the deficit using their 
foreign currency reserves or procuring other (non-private) forms of foreign capital. Possible 
sources of such foreign funds range from capital provided by international organizations such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other governments, to less visible transfers such 
as those recorded in EMU’s Target2 balances. However, financing the deficit is the 
appropriate policy response only to a temporary shock. When the current account deficit 
reflects fundamental macroeconomic and structural problems, substantial adjustment of 
economic policies aimed at a realignment of foreign and domestic prices. This can either be 
achieved through a depreciation or devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, a strategy called 
external adjustment, or through internal adjustment, also known as internal devaluation, in 
which domestic reforms (such as monetary and fiscal tightening and structural reforms) are 
undertaken to increase the economy’s competitiveness.3 Here, the goal is to deflate domestic 
prices through productivity gains and a reduction in domestic demand. Both strategies aim at 
making domestic products more competitive internationally and raising the price of imports, 
so that domestic expenditure is to be switched away from the consumption of internationally 
tradable goods and towards the production and export of such goods. 
All three crisis management strategies – financing, external, and internal adjustment – have 
significant downsides. The financing strategy is only viable as long as funding can be 
procured, either in form of foreign currency reserves or in terms of international financial 
support. Moreover, if the problems are of a fundamental nature and the time bought by 
financing is not used to implement reforms, it results in a further deterioration of the balance 
of payments problems that will necessitate a much more extensive adjustment later on.4 
Although a depreciation of the exchange rate tends to benefit the export-oriented sector, 
external adjustment also reduces purchasing power and leads to more volatile exchange rates 
and rising debt service on foreign-currency denominated loans (Frieden 1991; Walter 2008, 
2013). In addition, external adjustment often precipitates inflation and exchange-rate volatility 
and creates contagion risk for states with similar problems. It should thus come as no surprise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Elements of these adjustment strategies can also be combined. 
4 To avoid such a situation, official foreign funds are usually only provided under strict conditionality, which 
means that the recipient country is forced to implement reforms in return for access to foreign funds. 
Nonetheless, both the extent of these conditions and the compliance with conditionality vary significantly (for 
examples from the IMF see Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Dreher 2004; Stone 2008; Copelovitch 2010). 
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that devaluations have proven to be politically costly as well. Several studies show that voters 
are likely to punish policymakers who devalue the currency (e.g. Frieden and Stein 2001; 
Stein and Streb 2004; Blomberg et al. 2005; Walter 2009). Finally, internal adjustment is 
painful because it implies austerity (such as higher interest rates, public spending cuts, and tax 
increases) and structural reforms (such as measures designed to increase labor market 
flexibility or policies aimed at increasing competitiveness). In the short run, austerity typically 
leads to higher unemployment, lower wages, asset price deflation, and a recession. Structural 
reforms threaten the beneficiaries of the status quo: By abolishing subsidies and removing 
barriers to competition, such reforms destroy rents for these groups (for a related argument, 
see Hall 2012). As discussed above, some scholars suggest that overall, the political obstacles 
to implementing internal adjustment are so large, that the likelihood of success of such 
policies is very small in democratic countries (Eichengreen 1992; Simmons 1994).  
Balance-of-payments problems thus confront policymakers with a list of unattractive 
options. Which of these are they likely to choose, and how easy is it to implement these 
options? Building on previous research (Frieden 1991; Walter 2013; Walter and Willett 2012), 
I argue that a country’s vulnerabilities to internal and external adjustment strategies affect 
both the policy responses of national policymakers to balance-of-payments problems and 
crisis politics. Assuming that policymakers care both about their constituencies and the 
overall economy, this suggests that governments are going consider both the aggregate effects 
of different adjustment strategies on the country as a whole and the specific consequences of 
these strategies for their constituencies (Bearce 2003). Taking the economy’s overall 
vulnerabilities into account allows policymakers to design policies that maximize their 
reelection chances by targeting the median voter (Downs 1957). At the same time, as 
members of political parties, policymakers also care about ideology and the well-being of 
their specific constituencies, so that they design economic policies with these interests in 
mind (Hibbs 1977; Boix 1998; Garrett 1998). This implies that although the general direction 
of the adjustment path will be determined by a country’s overall vulnerabilities, the specific 
policy design will be shaped by the interests and ideological leanings of the political parties in 
government.  
Figure 1 summarizes the implications of this argument. When the country overall is 
significantly more vulnerable to one type of adjustment strategy than to another, then 
policymakers are likely to implement the policy to which it is less exposed in a swift and 
decisive manner. There are two possible cases in this scenario. First, when the country is very 
vulnerable to austerity and structural reforms, but less vulnerable to external adjustment, a 
 6 
rather quick depreciation of the exchange rate and a low reliance on (external) financing is 
likely to be the preferred adjustment strategy (quadrant I). For example, in a country 
characterized by a large and export-oriented manufacturing sector and inflexible labor 
markets, external adjustment should be the preferred strategy. This should be easier to 
implement for left-leaning governments, because their constituents tend to be more vulnerable 
to unemployment and expenditure cuts than those of conservative governments. Nonetheless, 
in such an environment the latter can also be expected to implement external adjustment, but 
they are more likely to combine these strategies with productivity-enhancing policies and 
measures that buffer the negative effects of devaluation for their constituents.5  
 
Figure 1: Vulnerability Profiles and Crisis Politics – Hypotheses 
	    
 
In the second case (quadrant II), the country overall is much more vulnerable to 
depreciation than to internal adjustment. An example would be a country in which the private 
sector holds high levels of foreign-currency denominated debt and relies heavily on imports, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Such as, for example, programs designed to support those owing foreign currency denominated debt. 
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while the economy is characterized by a sound fiscal position and a flexible economy. In this 
case governments are more likely to pursue a predominantly internal adjustment strategy, 
particularly when the necessary internal reforms can be designed in such a way that the core 
constituencies of the government can be spared. Conservative parties have an advantage in 
this respect. Because they represent the better-off, these parties should be more willing to 
implement internal adjustment strategies that lower inflation, decrease unit labor costs and 
increase productivity. When other parties operate in such a setting, they are likely to 
implement internal adjustment as well, but to design reforms that limit the negative impact on 
their constituencies. For example, agrarian parties can be expected to design structural 
reforms that do not affect farmers. Leftist parties should implement austerity policies in a less 
regressive manner and should be more willing to combine internal adjustment with a 
depreciation of the currency. Moreover, because domestic reforms do not depress domestic 
prices as quickly as a devaluation of the currency, governments pursuing this adjustment path 
are more likely to seek temporary and limited external funding to finance the current account 
deficit until the reforms bite. External financing should hence be regarded as a way to smooth, 
rather than avoid, adjustment. Negotiations about conditionality for such international support 
should therefore also be less conflictual and compliance should be better in these countries.  
Because policymakers implement policies that are clearly preferred to the alternative 
by the median voter, the policy process in both scenarios I and III should be characterized by 
lower levels of opposition and less tumultuous political environment than in countries where 
policymakers impose significant costs on society. And because policymakers design the 
adjustment strategies in ways that spare their own voters to the largest extent possible, the 
constituencies of the respective governing parties should be hit less hard by crisis and the 
government’s adjustment program than the constituencies of opposition parties or non-voters.  
Policymakers face a much more difficult situation when the country is very vulnerable 
to both internal and external adjustment (quadrant II). For example, when a country has a 
large non-tradable sector, inflexible labor markets, high levels of unemployment and 
widespread foreign-currency debt, both types of adjustment are going to have painful 
consequences. This creates severe political difficulties to implementing serious reforms and 
policymakers therefore have strong incentives to delay adjustment and to finance the current 
account deficit instead. Because adjustment is painful, they are also likely to try to keep the 
conditions attached to the required external financing to a minimum level both in the 
negotiations and during the implementation process, and compliance with conditionality is 
likely to be more spotty. Moreover, once adjustment becomes unavoidable (either because of 
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conditionality or because of market pressure), policymakers are likely to implement a mix of 
external and internal adjustment measures. Given the high costs associated with adjustment, 
there should be considerable political conflict both within government and the public about 
how specific adjustment policies and reforms should be designed. As a result, crisis politics in 
such settings is expected to be characterized by political conflict, government instability, and 
hot debates about the appropriate policy response to the crisis. Nonetheless, the specific 
design of the anti-crisis policy package once more should be tilted towards the benefit of the 
governments’ constituency.  
The situation is much easier for policymakers when vulnerabilities to both types of 
adjustment are low (quadrant IV). In this case, the issue is not likely to generate a lot of 
attention, which leaves policymakers a lot of leeway in deciding how to respond to the crisis. 
A financing, and hence a delayed adjustment is unlikely under these circumstances, because 
financing involves costs and the opposition to adjustment will be low.  
 
2. Empirical Evidence: Crisis Management in Eastern Europe 
To assess how well this argument can explain national variation in crisis responses and 
crisis politics, this section conducts a comparative case study of eight new EU member states 
in Central and Eastern Europe that experienced balance-of-payments pressures in the wake of 
the global financial crisis (2008-2010): Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. These countries were hit particularly hard by the 
global financial crisis (EBRD 2009; 2010; Connolly 2012; Myant and Drahokupil 2012). 
Most of them had boomed in the years following EU accession and had accumulated large 
current account deficits in the process. When the collapse of Lehman Brothers sent shock 
waves around the world in the fall of 2008, all of these economies experienced serious 
balance-of-payments pressures. Because they had not yet adopted the euro when the crisis hit 
the region, they had a certain leeway in choosing between internal and external adjustment – 
and policy responses and crisis politics indeed varied considerably.6  Some countries followed 
internal adjustment strategies, others mainly external strategies, and some chose more mixed 
strategies. Some countries relied heavily on external financing support by the IMF, the EU, 
and other sources, while others implemented their anti-crisis strategies without major external 
funding. Some acted swiftly, some only after considerable delay. Finally, the crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Slovenia and the Slovak Republic are not included because they had joined (Slovenia) or been accepted 
(Slovak Republic) into the eurozone by the summer of 2008. I focus on this time period because growth had 
returned to all countries in the sample by mid-2010 (even though some countries experienced renewed problems 
as a consequence of the eurozone crisis later on). 
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management was not very contentious in some countries, while others experienced severe 
political conflicts.  
The experiences of these countries are particularly interesting because the 
vulnerability profiles in the aggregate society and among governments’ constituencies varied 
considerably. And they are particularly instructive for understanding crisis politics in the 
eurocrisis because like the EMU crisis countries, they equally operated within the larger 
setting of the European Union, although freed from the restrictions of a common currency.  
 
2.1 Vulnerability Profiles in Eastern Europe 
My argument suggests that the differences in Eastern European crisis management and 
crisis politics should be related to variation in national vulnerability profiles. To substantiate 
this claim, this section classifies all eight countries with respect to their aggregate 
vulnerabilities to external and internal adjustment. Based on this analysis, the subsequent 
section will analyze how variation in vulnerability profiles was associated with variation in 
policy responses, crisis politics, and reform outcomes. 
To measure each country’s aggregate vulnerability to external and internal adjustment, 
respectively, I construct two indices. External adjustment tends to be particularly painful for 
countries with high levels of external and foreign-currency denominated debt and a high 
reliance on imported intermediate goods, but beneficial for countries with a strong export-
oriented sector. Moreover, it is a particularly costly strategy for countries that have committed 
themselves to a fixed exchange rate, in the case of Eastern Europe those countries that have 
pursued EMU-membership as a near-term goal. Aggregate vulnerability to external 
adjustment is therefore measured as an unweighted additive index of four standardized 
indicators on vulnerability to external adjustment and a dummy variable indicating whether a 
country was in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) at the time of the crisis. 
The following variables are included: a country’s share of foreign currency lending as a 
percentage of all lending to non-banks in 2007 (Brown et al. 2009), country’s net external 
debt in percent of GDP in 2007 (European Commission 2014), the import content of exports 
in 2007, i.e., the contribution that imports make in the production of exports of goods and 
services (OECD 2014), and exports in percent of GDP in 2007 (Schwab and Porter 2008).7 I 
also add a dummy variable for ERM II membership (the Baltics) or a currency board 
(Bulgaria), because devaluation tends to have significant negative political and economic 
ramifications in regimes with fixed exchange rate regimes that go beyond those vulnerabilities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I use an inverted scale for exports (exports minus one) because a lower prevalence of exports implies a higher 
vulnerability to external adjustment. 
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measured by the other indicators in the index. For example, for countries in ERM II, external 
adjustment would imply a violation of one of the four convergence criteria for their planned 
entry into EMU, which would make near-term euro accession impossible. In addition, an exit 
from these fixed exchange rate regimes would carry significant contagion risks across the 
region. 
Internal adjustment becomes the more costly the higher the costs of austere 
macroeconomic policies and the more entrenched the economic structures are that structural 
reforms intend to liberalize. I use four variables that capture various dimensions of 
vulnerability to internal adjustment for the year 2007. The first two variables, the national 
unemployment rate (European Commission 2014: table 3.15), and the level of wage rigidity	  
(Schwab and Porter 2008),8 measure the vulnerability of national labor markets to internal 
adjustment. In countries with high levels of wage rigidity, internal adjustment tends to depress 
wages through an increase in unemployment rather than to lower wages, which tends to be 
particularly painful in countries with already high levels of unemployment. The third variable 
records the pre-crisis fiscal deficit in percent of GDP (Eurostat 2014), because higher fiscal 
deficits imply higher budget cuts and stronger tax increases. The final indicator is the 
regulatory burden (Schwab and Porter 2008), which is used as a measure of how entrenched 
economic structures are in a country.9 I construct an unweighted additive index based on these 
four standardized variables. 
Figure 2 shows the vulnerability profiles of eight Eastern European economies on the 
basis of these two indices. It shows that all four quadrants are occupied by at least one country. 
Quadrant I, on the upper left, contains Poland, a country with a low vulnerability to external 
adjustment rooted in a low exposure of Polish firms and households to foreign-currency debt, 
the flexible and appreciated exchange rate, well-contained inflation and the fact that that euro 
adoption was not an immediate priority. In contrast, high unemployment, a rather strained 
fiscal situation, and mainly domestic currency-denominated debt tied to domestic interest 
rates made the Polish median voter and the centrist Polish government’s constituency very 
vulnerable to internal adjustment. Given this vulnerability profile, the argument predicts that 
Poland should pursue predominantly external adjustment in a swift and relatively uncontested 
manner and with little recourse to external funding. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This variable is a survey-based measure of the perceived flexibility of wage determination I use an inverted 
scale, in which higher values denote less flexibility. 
9 I use an inverted scale, where higher values denote a higher regulatory burden. 
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Figure 2: Vulnerability Profiles in eight Eastern European countries 
 
 
Romania and Hungary occupy quadrant II, putting these countries in the 
uncomfortable position of being highly vulnerable to both external and internal adjustment. 
Foreign-currency denominated borrowing had been very common in these countries, creating 
high vulnerabilities to devaluation among households and the private sector. At the same time, 
a strained fiscal position with high levels of public debt (especially in Hungary) and an 
overheated economy (especially in Romania) made them vulnerable to internal adjustment as 
well. Hungary’s leftist government, which mainly represented “cosmopolitan, post-
communist and anti-clerical“ voters	   (Bértoa 2014: 24), faced constituents who were 
vulnerable to fiscal tightening. Because Romania went through a rather unstable political time 
when the crisis hit, with changing government coalitions that oscillated between center-right 
and center-left orientations, the constituency of these governments frequently changed, 
although it was concentrated in the middle of the political spectrum. Overall, this suggests 
that both exchange-rate depreciation and internal adjustment measures should constitute 
important elements of the adjustment strategy eventually implemented (with a higher reliance 
on external adjustment in Romania than Hungary), but also that crisis management should be 
very contentious and characterized by delay and recourse to external sources of financing. As 
before, however, the main constituency of the governing parties should emerge as the group 
least harmed by the crisis. 
The biggest cluster of countries occupies quadrant III and consists of Bulgaria and the 
Baltic republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These countries exhibited a low to moderate 
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high vulnerability to external adjustment was rooted in the very high level of foreign-currency 
denominated borrowing by private households and firms (between 56.5% in Bulgaria and 
almost 90% of all bank loans in Latvia in 2009 (ECB 2011: S17)), the high reliance on 
imported intermediate goods, and the potential problems associated with exiting from the 
fixed exchange rate regime and/or ERM II were large. Such an exit meant not only 
jeopardizing the near-term goal of euro adoption (which also had a geopolitical dimension in 
terms of deepening the ties with the West in light of geopolitical challenges posed by Russia), 
but also carried large contagion risks across the other fixed exchange-rate regimes and was 
strongly opposed by EU officials. In contrast, rather flexible labor markets, especially in the 
Baltics, (Purfield and Rosenberg 2010) and relatively low levels of government debt and 
unemployment meant that although internal adjustment was bound to inflict pain on most 
people, this pain was much lower than the potential pain of external adjustment. In terms of 
constituency vulnerabilities, with the exception of Bulgaria, all countries were governed by 
(center-)right parties. Their core constituents were the better-off, but were also more likely to 
hold foreign-currency debt, making them in general more vulnerable to external than to 
internal adjustment. Overall, this suggests speedy internal adjustment as preferred adjustment 
strategy, with a limited reliance on external funding, and low levels of political conflict about 
the crisis management. 
Finally, the Czech Republic is located in quadrant IV, indicating a low aggregate 
vulnerability to both external and internal adjustment. The country’s strong export-orientation 
and the low level of external debt and foreign-currency lending limited its vulnerability to 
depreciation. In terms of vulnerability to internal adjustment, the Czech Republic mainly 
benefitted from relatively low unemployment and rather flexible economic structures, 
although its fiscal situation was a little more strained. Given that vulnerability to external 
adjustment was lower than that to internal adjustment, we would expect Czech policymakers 
to prioritize external adjustment and to implement it rather swiftly, but reliance on external 
funds should be limited and the issue not to be strongly politicized. 
  
2.2 Managing the Crisis in Eastern Europe 
The previous section showed that although all new EU member states in Eastern Europe 
exhibited current account deficits at the outset of the crisis, their aggregate vulnerabilities to 
external and internal adjustment varied considerably. This suggests that these countries should 
vary significantly with regard to the types of policy responses chosen, their reliance on 
(external) financing, and the contentiousness of the national crisis management. Despite these 
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different expected policy trajectories, however, the argument also predicts that in all countries, 
the core constituencies of the government should emerge as the group least harmed by the 
crisis. This section examines each of these hypotheses. 
 
2.2.1 Policy Responses, Timing, and Reliance on Financing 
Although all eight Eastern European countries experienced severe balance-of-
payments pressures in 2008, their policy responses to this crisis differed substantially. Figure 
2 shows that countries typically pursued one of three types of policy responses: external 
adjustment (Poland and the Czech Republic), internal adjustment (Bulgaria and the Baltic 
states) and more mixed strategies (Romania and Hungary). Figure 2 also shows that as 
expected, the choice of adjustment strategy corresponds with the countries’ respective 
vulnerability profiles. Countries typically chose the adjustment path to which they were less 
vulnerable in the aggregate, or chose mixed strategies when vulnerability to both types of 
adjustment were high. 
More specifically, Poland and the Czech Republic adjusted externally in a rather swift 
manner and with little recourse to financing. Policymakers let exchange rates depreciate 
immediately when pressures emerged. Moreover, rather than implementing contractionary 
internal adjustment, they initially pursued expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. This 
was particularly pronounced in the Czech Republic, where the low vulnerability to adjustment 
was also rooted in the fact that imbalances were less pronounced than in other Eastern 
European economies. As a result, between August 2008 and February 2009, the Polish Zloty 
lost 32% and the Czech Koruna 15% of their August 2008 values. In Poland, this strategy was 
supported by a precautionary IMF program, which gave Poland the option – ultimately not 
used – to draw on IMF funds quickly if strong speculative pressure should emerge.10 
Although both countries benefited from accelerated access to structural and cohesion funds 
from the EU, the principal Czech and Polish response to the balance of payments pressures 
was thus quick external adjustment with very limited financing. This behavior is in line with 
expectations for countries located in quadrants I and IV in figures 1 and 2, that is countries 
with a low vulnerability to a depreciation of their currencies. 
Policymakers in the Baltic states and Bulgaria chose a different adjustment path in 
response to the global financial crisis. Policymakers in these countries successfully tackled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The precautionary flexible credit line (FCL), which Poland agreed with the IMF in April 2009, is a new type 
of IMF program that is available only to countries with strong economic fundamentals and policy track records. 
It gives policymakers the flexibility to draw on the specified fund at any time within a pre-specified window, 
but is precautionary insofar as it is intended to provide a shield against speculative pressure and therefore does 
not necessarily involve a disbursement of funds. 	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their severe balance-of-payments problems through policies aimed at an “internal devaluation” 
of domestic prices, most notably fiscal austerity and nominal wage adjustment, while keeping 
their exchange rates unchanged. The countries implemented painful domestic reforms such as 
wage and expenditure cuts, substantial reductions in public sector employment, and some tax 
increases (for a more detailed discussion, see Aslund 2010; Purfield and Rosenberg 2010; 
Kattel and Raudla 2013).11 Because internal adjustment takes more time to affect domestic 
prices than external adjustment it is not surprising that all countries combined their 
adjustment path with a financing component to meet the strong pressure on their currencies 
and banking sectors. Financing came from internal (especially in Estonia) and external 
sources. All four countries used external funds from the EU, which were granted mainly 
through an easier access to structural and cohesion funds. The Baltic countries additionally 
received substantial bilateral support from the Nordic countries, especially from Sweden and 
Norway, whose banking sectors were heavily exposed to these economies. But only one 
country (Latvia) turned to the IMF to receive large-scale balance of payments support in the 
form of a regular stand-by-agreement. Taken together, the chosen path of internal adjustment 
policies successfully staved off speculative pressure, brought down price levels, and led to a 
significant reduction in the current account deficit. However, these measures also caused a 
collapse in growth and massive increases in unemployment. Between 2007 and 2010, 
unemployment increased by almost one half in Bulgaria, doubled in Latvia, more than 
doubled in Estonia, and tripled in Lithuania. Overall, the policy responses chosen by these 
four countries correspond well with the predictions for countries with a high vulnerability to 
external and a lower vulnerability to internal adjustment (quadrant III in figures 1 and 2). 
In Hungary and Romania, policymakers showed more reluctance to adjust and 
therefore relied more on combining external and internal adjustment measures with current 
account financing through foreign reserve sales and external support from the international 
community. When the global financial crisis hit these economies, the currencies in both 
countries came under increasing pressure. Both central banks raised interest rates and 
intervened on the foreign exchange market with foreign reserve sales to slow down the 
depreciation of their currencies. When intervention proved insufficient and depreciation 
accelerated in the early fall of 2008 despite efforts to finance the deficit rather than 
substantially adjust economic policies, both countries sought external sources of funding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Policymakers explained their policy choice mainly with reference to four issues: the high level of foreign-
currency borrowing, the high contagion risk associated with a devaluation of one of the fixed currencies, the 
unclear effect of devaluation on exports, and the high level of labor market flexibility (Walter 2013: 207-8). 
This suggests that they were acutely aware of the significant direct and indirect vulnerabilities of the economy 
more generally and their constituencies in particular. 
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mainly from the IMF and the EU. Hungary concluded an agreement with the IMF, the EU and 
others in October 2008. In return for the US$ 25 billion package, it agreed to implement 
internal adjustment measures, most notably fiscal consolidation aimed at reducing Hungary’s 
large fiscal deficits and high level of public debt. At the same time, it continued to pursue a 
mixed adjustment strategy by letting the currency depreciate further. Romania endured a 
longer decline of its currency before turning to the IMF in March 2009, but then equally 
committed itself to an austerity program designed to stabilize the currency and to rebalance 
the economy. In return, it received US$ 27 billion financing support from the IMF, the EU, 
the World Bank, and the EBRD. The fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms 
implemented in both countries were painful. Economic growth turned negative, 
unemployment and the proportion of non-performing loans increased, and wages fell, albeit to 
a lesser extent than in the Baltic states. In both countries, the high level of foreign-currency 
denominated debt emerged as “a key concern” during the crisis and a major topic of political 
and public debate (e.g., EBRD 2010), alongside with concerns about public finances and the 
domestic economic situation.12 Given the high levels of vulnerability to both internal and 
external adjustment in these countries, the mix of depreciation, foreign exchange intervention 
and the conclusion of the IMF/EU rescue packages, which required the implementation of 
internal adjustment measures such as fiscal retrenchment and structural reforms squares with 
the predictions of this paper’s argument for countries located in quadrant II of figures 1 and 2. 
 
2.2.2 Crisis Politics 
Eastern European countries not only varied with regard to their policy responses to the 
crisis, but also with regard to the severity of political conflicts associated with these different 
crisis management strategies. This section shows that the experience of the eight countries 
examined here squares with the argument’s prediction that crisis management should be most 
conflict-prone in contexts in which vulnerability to any adjustment is high (quadrant II). In 
contrast, crisis politics should be less contentious in countries that exhibit a low vulnerability 
to at least one type of adjustment strategy (quadrants I, III, and particularly IV). .  
 In Poland (quadrant I), the choice of the external adjustment path was quite 
uncontroversial. Especially the export industry viewed the depreciation of the currency as a 
welcome reversal of the exchange-rate appreciation experienced in the pre-crisis months, 
although the depreciating currency in general did not receive a lot of public attention. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 In both countries, the governments also introduced measures to discourage foreign currency borrowing and 
the Hungarian government created several policy instruments designed to support debt-laden households 
holding foreign currency denominated debt. 
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uncontroversial nature of the crisis management was also reflected in the high level of public 
support for the centrist coalition government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk, which 
remained comfortably high throughout the crisis (Tworzecki 2012; CBOS Public Opinion 
2011). The coalition partners did well in all elections, including the presidential elections in 
July 2010, and local elections in November 2010 and the parliamentary elections in October 
2011, and Poland was one of the few countries in the region where more conservative 
challengers did not replace the incumbent government during the crisis (see table 1).  
In the Baltic republics and Bulgaria (quadrant II), the decision to maintain exchange 
rate stability at the price of serious internal adjustment likewise enjoyed strong popular and 
political support despite the very painful consequences of this adjustment strategy (Kuokstis 
and Vilpisauskas 2010; EIU 2009; Kattel and Raudla 2013). Even in Latvia, the hardest-hit of 
these countries, almost two-thirds of respondents of an opinion poll conducted in August 2009, 
at the peak of the crisis, said that they wanted their currency’s peg to the euro to remain 
unchanged (Aslund 2010: 35). This is not to say that the path of internal adjustment was 
politically easy. In January 2009, riots erupted in the capitals of both Latvia and Lithuania in 
the aftermath of initially peaceful demonstrations against austerity measures and the 
government more generally. In most countries, the coalition partners in government fought 
over the specific internal adjustment measures in an effort to spare their own voters the worst 
pain, even if the strategy itself was never substantively questioned. There were also 
occasional discussions about the merits of defending the currency board arrangements in light 
of the enormous cost this strategy was imposing on the domestic economies. Nonetheless, 
although external adjustment was discussed as a distinct policy option in international policy 
circles13 and initially was the IMF’s preferred policy response for Latvia (IMF 2009; Lütz and 
Kranke 2013), this option was ruled out, or not even considered, by most domestic analysts 
(Kuokstis and Vilpisauskas 2010). In light of the extent of adjustment necessary and the 
immense pain imposed on the domestic populations in the course of its implementation in the 
form of a massive increase in unemployment, higher taxes, and significant cuts in wages and 
public expenditure, however, crisis politics were surprisingly uncontentious. Nevertheless, 
political tremors did affect all four countries and changes in the government occurred, 
although in each case, more reform-minded parties and politicians were voted into office (see 
table 1). For example, in Estonia the Social Democrats left the government when their more 
right-leaning coalition partners proposed reforms that squarely hurt their core constituency 
(Raudla and Kattel 2011). But given the size of reforms and the harshness of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Examples include Nouriel Roubini (Financial Times, 10 June 2009), Kenneth Rogoff (Bloomberg,	  29	   June	  2009), or Paul Krugman (New York Times Blog, 23	  December	  2008) 
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consequences for the domestic economies, conventional political economy approaches would 
lead us to expect much more far-reaching difficulties, protests, and election outcomes (e.g., 
Remmer 1991; Pacek 1994; Eichengreen 1992; Simmons 1994). Although this broad 
consensus about the strategy of internal devaluation also stemmed in part from geopolitical 
concerns regarding the “Russian Bear” and the wish to tie the country ever more closely to the 
West through EMU membership (especially in the Baltics), the Baltic “patience culture,” and 
the weakly developed civil society (Kattel and Raudla 2013), this consensus seems to have 
been facilitated by the rather uniform vulnerability profile amongst voters and the 
governments’ constituencies.  
In a similar vein, the choice of the external adjustment path was uncontroversial in the 
Czech Republic as well. Nonetheless, Czech politics was muddled and unstable in the years 
surrounding the global financial crisis. Notably, however, this instability had characterized 
Czech politics even before the crisis hit and was not directly related to the decision to let the 
economy adjust externally. In fact, the depreciation of the koruna played no role in the 
political debate, which was dominated by other issues. In 2008, the year in which all of 
Eastern Europe was heavily mired in financial crisis, the four most important issues in Czech 
politics were the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a treaty between the Czech Republic and 
the United States on the location of an American anti-missile radar in Czech territory, 
questions about church property, and, only fourth, the reduction of the welfare state (Linek 
and Lacina 2010). However, although the Czech government had implemented reforms that 
were far less painful than those of the other Eastern European countries and additionally 
implemented some stimulus measures to soften the impact of the global financial crisis, 
unemployment eventually increased in the wake of the global financial crisis and domestic 
economic conditions and the growing fiscal deficit became increasingly salient (Stegmaier 
and Vlachová 2011). The political environment was quite turbulent in this period: the 
inherently unstable coalition government fell in a vote of no confidence in March 2009 and 
was replaced by a technocratic caretaker government, and two new parties entered the 
political scene. Nonetheless, throughout the crisis years, one party, the Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS), continuously participated in or supported the respective governments and was 
also able to hold on to the presidency. The Czech case thus shows that domestic politics is 
likely to be rather unaffected by balance-of-payments adjustment when vulnerability to any 
adjustment among influential societal groups is low. 
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Table 1: Government composition, 2007-2010 
Country Start date Cabinet name left-right score Cabinet parties Cabinet type 
Poland 2007-11-16 Tusk II 5.99 PO,  PSL minimum winning cabinet 
Hungary 2006-06-09 Gyurcsany II 2.98 MSZP, SzDSz minimum winning cabinet 
 
2008-05-02  Gyurcsany III 2.87 MSZP minority cabinet 
 
2009-04-14 Bajnai 2.87 MSZP minority cabinet 
 
2010-05-29 Orban II 6.66 Fidesz, KDNP surplus majority coalition 
Romania 2007-04-05 
Popescu-
Tariceanu III  6.04 PNL minority cabinet 
 
2008-12-22 Boc I 4.33 PD-L, PSD minimum winning cabinet 
 
2009-12-23 Boc II 5.49 PD-L, UDMR minority cabinet 
 
2010-05-19 Boc III 5.30 PD-L, UDMR, UNPR minority cabinet 
Estonia 2007-04-05 Ansip II 7.47 Ere, IRL, SDE minimum winning cabinet 
 
2009-05-21 Ansip III 8.12 Ere, IRL minority cabinet 
 
2011-04-05 Ansip IV 8.14 Ere, IRL minimum winning cabinet 
Latvia 2007-12-20 Godmanis II 6.99 
TP, ZZS,LPP/LC, 
TB/LNNK minimum winning cabinet 
 
2009-02-26 Dombrovskis I 6.98 
TP, ZZS, JL, PS, 
TB/LNNK surplus majority coalition 
 
2010-03-17 Dombrovskis II 6.58 
ZZS, JL, PS, 
TB/LNNK minority cabinet 
 
2010-11-03 Dombrovskis III 6.51 V, ZZS minimum winning cabinet 
Lithuania 2006-07-18 Kirkilas I 5.46 
LSDP, 
LiCS,PDP,LVLS minority cabinet 
 
2008-11-27 Kubilius II 7.84 
TS-LKD, TPP, LRLS, 
LiCS minimum winning cabinet 
 
2010-09-21 Kubilius III  7.63 
TS-LKD,LiCS- TPP, 
LRLS minimum winning cabinet 
Bulgaria 2005-08-17  Stanishev 4.08 KzB, NDSV, DPS surplus majority coalition 
 
2009-07-27 Borisov 7.33 GERB minority cabinet 
Czech 
Republic 2007-01-09 Topolanek II 6.97 ODS, KDU/CSL, SZ minority cabinet 
 
2009-04-09 Fischer 5.26 
none (supported by 
ODS, CSSD, SZ) caretaker government 
 
2010-06-28 Necas I 7.07 ODS, TOP09, VV minimum winning cabinet 
Data source: ParlGov database {www.parlgov.org, \ Döring, 2013 #1900}. Ideological (left-right) orientation of 
the government is the weighted mean of all respective cabinet parties.  
 
In contrast, the incumbent governments in Hungary and Romania, the two countries 
where vulnerabilities to both internal and external adjustment were high (quadrant II), faced 
significant political problems and electoral challenges. Although these political difficulties 
were not solely related to the economic crisis but also to corruption charges, crisis 
management proved highly controversial. In Hungary, the Socialist minority government 
presided over the strong speculative pressure on the forint in the fall of 2008, to which it 
responded with a mix of depreciation, financing and some internal adjustment. These 
measures and their painful consequences were unpopular and the Socialist Prime Minister 
Ferenc Gyurcsány resigned in March 2009 amidst public protests and strikes, worsening 
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economic conditions, and a falling currency.14 His government was replaced by a more 
technocratic government, which implemented deeper spending cuts and more far-reaching 
structural reforms in an attempt to ease pressure on the currency, whose depreciation was 
causing major problems for many Hungarians with foreign-currency loans. In the wake of 
these policies, unemployment and inflation increased further, heightening discontent with the 
government and creating an antagonistic political atmosphere (Varnagy 2010). The incumbent 
Socialists lost about two thirds of their seats in parliament in the next regular elections in 
April 2010, whereas the main opposition party, the rightist Fidesz, won a landslide victory 
and a new extreme right party (Jobbik) emerged as a player on the political scene. In Romania, 
the incumbent center-right coalition government was resoundingly defeated in elections held 
in November 2008, at the height of the crisis. After some difficult negotiations, a new center-
left coalition government formed, but conflicts about how to address the economic crisis arose 
quickly between the coalition partners. The conclusion of the IMF program in March 2009 
committed the governing parties to internal adjustment measures, but these were only 
implemented in a half-hearted manner (Stan and Zaharia 2010). The divergent policy stances 
of both parties led to increasing tensions within the government, which culminated in its 
breakdown in October 2009 amidst major protests against the government’s austerity 
measures. The new center-right government implemented more austere adjustment measures 
(Aslund 2010) but continued to face political difficulties: in June 2010 it narrowly escaped a 
vote of no-confidence concerning its proposal to cut public sector wages and pensions and in 
October a general strike with 800'000 participants paralyzed the country. The difficult 
political environment led to significant delays in the highly contentious crisis management. 
Overall, the experiences of Hungary and Romania thus highlight the political difficulties 
associated with implementing macroeconomic adjustment in countries in which voters exhibit 
high vulnerabilities to both external and internal adjustment.  
 
2.2.3 Policy Outcomes: The distributional effects of crisis management 
The previous two sections have shown that the variation in adjustment paths and crisis 
politics among the new EU member states in Eastern Europe in the context of the global 
financial crisis are related to differences in vulnerability profiles, particularly on the aggregate 
level. This section now turns to the policy outcomes and engages in a more fine-grained 
analysis of the distributional effects of crisis management within these countries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 He had been in a difficult position ever since his open admission that he had lied to the public about the need 
for fiscal retrenchment in order to be elected had been leaked to the public. 
 20 
Although my argument predicts that differences in aggregate vulnerability profiles 
influence the choice of adjustment strategy, it also suggests that all governments design these 
policies in ways that privilege their own constituencies. Empirically, this implies that across 
all countries, the governments’ core constituencies should be least negatively affected by the 
crisis, irrespective of the general type of adjustment path.  
To test this hypothesis, I use data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), which was conducted in 21 European countries in October 2010.15 The survey covers 
four of the countries analyzed in this paper, and these vary with regard to vulnerability 
profiles, adjustment strategies and government ideology: In Poland (vulnerability type I), the 
centrist governments followed a path of external adjustment, the leftist government in 
Hungary (vulnerability type II) mixed external and internal adjustment elements and 
combined this with extensive use of financing, Estonia’s rightist government (vulnerability 
type III) pursued internal adjustment, and the center(-right) government in the Czech 
Republic (vulnerability type IV) predominantly relied on external adjustment. The survey 
included a battery of questions on the effects of the global financial crisis, two of which are 
particularly well suited to investigating the overall effect of the government’s crisis 
management on individuals. These questions focus on the change in respondents’ personal 
economic situation over the past three (crisis) years. Both questions ask respondents to rate on 
a 0 (not at all) to 6 (a great deal) scale whether they “have had to manage on a lower 
household income” (question Q8) and whether they “have had to draw on [their] savings or 
get into debt to cover ordinary living expenses” (question Q9).16  
To identify voters belonging to the respective governments’ main constituencies, I 
grouped each respondent into one of three categories: government voters, opposition voters, 
or non-voters. Based on information on which party they felt closest to (or if this information 
is not available, which party they had voted for in the last election) and whether they had 
voted at all in the last election, I classified respondents as government voters, if they had 
voted to or felt close to those parties that were in government during most of the crisis.17 I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
16 Results are robust to using to alternative indicators, respondents rating of the statement „I have had to cut back 
on holidays or new household equipment“ (Q10) and whether the respondent is currently unemployed. Since 
unemployment and a cut-back in holidays/equipment are likely to be more prevalent among poorer households, I 
prefer the other two measures. 
17 These parties are: a) the Estonian Reform Party, Union of Pro Patria, Social Democratic Party (which left the 
government in May 2009) in Estonia (EE), b) the Hungarian Socialist Party (in office between May 2008 and 
May 2010) in Hungary (HU), c) Civic Democratics, Christian Democratic Union, and Greens who formed a 
center-right government between January 2007 and March 2009 in the Czech Republic (CZ). Between April 
2009 and June 2010, a technocratic, nonpartisan government was in charge, with the support of Civic 
Democratics (ODS), Social Democrats (CSSD), Greens (SZ), who did not, however, participate in the 
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chose those parties rather than those in office at the time of the survey, because I am 
interested in the consequences of crisis management. In two countries (Hungary and the 
Czech Republic), the government changed a few months before the survey was taken. This is 
fortunate, because it allows me to discriminate between the effect of being in the (former) 
government’s camp and potential cognitive biases which let voters view the situation more 
favorably when “their” party is in power (e.g., Wlezien et al. 1997; Evans and Andersen 
2006; Gerber and Huber 2010).18 Individuals who voted for a political party that was not in 
government during most of the crisis is coded as opposition voters, and respondents who did 
not vote in the last election are coded as non-voters. 
 
Figure 3: Impact of the crisis on households, by voter group 
 
Note: Weighted mean values for each voter group. Data are weighted by the design weight. Government voters 
are identified as voters of the parties that were in government during the crisis. Data are from the European 
Social Survey 2010 (survey conducted in October 2010). 
 
Figure 3 shows that in all countries, voters in the government camp fared better than 
voters in the opposition camp and non-voters. The figure displays the weighted means of the 
two measures of respondents’ assessment of the changes in their personal economic situation 
over the past three years for each subgroup of respondents. The difference between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
government and are therefore not counted as additional government parties. d) Civic Platform and Polish 
Peasants’ Party in Poland (PL).  
18 The main results hold (but are weaker, as expected) when the new government parties that ruled in Hungary 
and the Czech Republic from June 2010 onwards are additionally included as governing parties. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 a great deal    
PL, external
CZ, external
HU, mixed
EE, internal
Voter Government
Voter Opposition
Non-voter
Voter Government
Voter Opposition
Non-voter
Voter Government
Voter Opposition
Non-voter
Voter Government
Voter Opposition
Non-voter
Househ. had to draw on savings/debt to cover ordinary living expenses
Household had to manage on lower household income
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government voters and all other respondents is statistically significant at the 1%-level in all 
countries but Hungary.19 This means that in each country, the government’s constituency was 
less affected by the crisis than all other groups – irrespective of the country’s vulnerability 
profile, adjustment path, or the government’s partisan orientation. Likewise, non-voters were 
the most negatively affected. From the viewpoint of a vote-maximizing government, this 
behavior makes sense: while at least some voters from the opposing camp can potentially turn 
into allies, non-voters are not even part of the wider constituency. As such, they are most 
vulnerable politically, and the evidence shows that this group bore the largest pain during the 
crisis. 
To examine this result in more detail, I further investigate which specific groups 
reported more or less serious effects of the crisis. I use the question about changes in the 
household income as dependent variable, but results are robust to using the savings/debt 
question instead. In addition to basic demographic information (age, gender, education level), 
I identified a number of groups that represent potentially relevant constituencies for political 
parties.20  First, I distinguish respondents based on income, because left parties generally 
represent voters with lower incomes and conservative parties typically represent the better-off. 
Income is measured as an ordinal measure that reports the difference between a respondent’s 
income class and the median income class per country and ranges from -5 to +5, with higher 
values indicating that the respondent is better off than the median respondent.21 Higher-
income voters should report less problems in countries governed by (center-)right 
governments at the time of the crisis, here Estonia, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic 
and Poland. Since left-leaning parties often have closer ties to trade unions, I also control for 
union membership, expecting that union members should be better off in countries with left 
governments (here in Hungary).22 Second, I look at different types of employers, focusing on 
whether the respondent works in the public sector, in a state-owned enterprise (SOE), is self-
employed, or works in the private sector (the base category).23 Given that the structural 
reforms associated with internal adjustment are often targeted towards the public sector and 
SOEs, this would suggest that respondents working in these areas should be particularly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This might be related to the significant vote losses of the Hungarian Socialist Party over the course of the 
crisis, which are also reflected in the ESS. In this data this formerly largest party only records a voter share of 
13.8%, suggesting that a substantial portion of former MSZP voters are not counted as government voters in the 
analysis.  
20 Age: question F3, gender, question F2, education level question F15. 
21 The variable is based on question F41. Unfortunately, the ESS survey does not include any information about 
respondent’s financial situation, especially foreign-currency denominated debt. 
22 Question F39 
23 Question F32. 
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strongly hit in Estonia (internal adjustment) and Hungary (mixed adjustment). Finally, I look 
at several sociodemographic groups: pensioners, families, and people living in rural areas.24 
Table 2 shows the results of OLS regression analyses of respondents’ assessments 
about the crisis effects on their household on these different groups (models a). Positive 
values denote that a group was more negatively affected, while negative values imply that the 
respective group was less negatively affected. Because I am not only interested in the 
distributive effects across society, but particularly interested in the distributive effects across 
different constituencies, I compare these results to analyses of the composition of the 
government’s constituency. For this purpose, for each country the second column in table 3 
(models b) shows the results of logit models that examine to what extent each of these groups 
is associated with a higher probability of belonging to the government’s constituency 
(measured as above in terms of whether a respondent voted for one of the governing parties). 
The results show some interesting communalities and differences across countries. In 
all countries, the crisis had a regressive effect, with poorer respondents reporting more 
negative effects of the crisis than richer respondents. However, this effect was least 
pronounced in Hungary, which in contrast to the other three countries had a leftist 
government during much of the crisis. In the other three countries, wealthier individuals are 
more likely to be part of the government constituency, and also less likely to have a lower 
household income as a result of the crisis. Families were significantly hit harder by the crisis 
than other households in all four countries. This effect is particularly large in Poland, which is 
a country in which families are less likely to be part of the government constituency, and in 
Hungary. In contrast, respondents living in rural areas in Poland report significantly less 
serious repercussions of the crisis. Because the agrarian “Polish Peasants party” participated 
as the junior partner in the Polish government, this squares with the prediction that 
governments try to design their policies in ways that attenuate the effects of a crisis on their 
own voters.25 Likewise, in Estonia older people are more likely to vote for the government 
parties, and pensioners report less severe consequences of the crisis. 
Table 2 also shows some unexpected findings. For example, given that Estonia 
implemented internal adjustment, it is surprising to see that government and public sector 
employees as well as workers in state-owned enterprises were in fact less severely hit by the 
crisis than respondents working in the private sector, a pattern that is repeated to some extent 
in mixed-adjustment pursuing Hungary. One could speculate that these groups enjoyed better  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Questions F17a, F1 (family is defined as a household with children), F14, respectively. 
25 A similar pattern with regard to rural voters, though less substantially and statistically significant, can be 
observed in Estonia and the Czech Republic. 
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Table 2: Different constituencies and the impact of the crisis and vote choice 
 
Estonia 
 
Hungary 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Poland 
 
 
(a) 
Lower 
income 
(OLS) 
(b) 
Governm. 
vote 
(logit) 
(a) 
Lower 
income 
(OLS) 
(b) 
Governm. 
vote 
(logit) 
(a) 
Lower 
income 
(OLS) 
(b) 
Governm. 
vote 
(logit) 
(a) 
Lower 
income 
(OLS) 
(b) 
Governm. 
vote 
(logit) 
         Income -0.251*** 0.181*** -0.174*** 0.007 -0.318*** 0.115*** -0.269*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)    
Union member 0.022 0.069 0.036 0.168 -0.252 -0.174 0.419* -0.025    
 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.21) (0.25) (0.19) (0.35) (0.23) (0.26)    
Public sector -0.463*** 0.175 -0.060 0.325 0.006 0.517** -0.185 0.036    
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19)    
State-owned  -0.367** -0.410* -0.443** 0.016 -0.088 0.312 -0.216 -0.104    
     enterprise (0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.25) (0.18) (0.21)    
Self-employed -0.163 0.891* 0.163 -0.272 0.014 0.587** 0.240 0.535*   
 
(0.34) (0.46) (0.28) (0.36) (0.24) (0.29) (0.21) (0.28)    
Retired -0.558*** -0.324 -0.628*** 0.013 -0.227 -0.194 -0.154 -0.206    
 
(0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.18) (0.25) (0.19) (0.22)    
Children 0.339*** 0.186 0.792*** -0.051 0.496*** 0.111 0.654*** -0.244*   
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14)    
Rural -0.016 0.650*** 0.092 0.018 -0.084 0.333* -0.298** -0.124    
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.14)    
Age -0.004 0.019*** 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.003    
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)    
Female 0.161 0.335** -0.003 0.342** 0.097 -0.136 0.059 0.175    
 
(0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14)    
Education level 0.044 0.420*** -0.126* -0.024 -0.139** 0.343*** 0.006 0.098    
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)    
Constant 3.315*** -2.825*** 3.149*** -1.741*** 3.738*** -3.021*** 2.613*** -0.524    
 
(0.25) (0.35) (0.36) (0.42) (0.29) (0.45) (0.26) (0.34)    
N 1501 1132 1195 1019 1675 1256 1293 927 
R2 0.104 
 
0.092 
 
0.145 
 
0.124 
 Adj. R2 
Pseudo R2 
0.098 
 0.1120 
0.084 
 0.0484 
0.139 
 0.0496 
0.116 
 0.0321 
F 
Wald chi2 
16.863 
 144.76 
11.069 
 38.18 
21.830 
 49.37 
17.586 
 38.69 
* p ≤ .1; ** p ≤ .05; *** p ≤ .01 
Values in parentheses are standard errors. Data are weighted by the design weight. Dependent variables: 
Assessment of the statement “I have had to manage on a lower household income in the past three years”, with 
higher values denoting more consent to the statement. Government voter is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the respondents feel closest to one of the party in government during most of the crisis (see 
footnote 17). 
 
structural access to the decision-making arena, which allowed them to influence the policy 
design in their favor. In contrast, possibly as a reflection of the more indiscriminate effects of 
external adjustment, in the Czech Republic and Poland there are no differences between 
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respondents that are self-employed or working in the private or public sector – even though 
some of these groups are more likely to belong the respective governments’ constituencies. 
Overall, this final part of the analysis shows that the negative effects of the crisis and 
the policy responses pursued by the national governments did have clear distributive 
consequences. Some groups were hit harder than others, and despite all the differences across 
the four countries, the group that emerged least harmed in each of the countries consistently 
was the group that had voted for the parties in government during the crisis.  
 
2.3 Conclusion: Crisis and Adjustment in Eastern Europe 
The Eastern European experience during the recent global financial crisis shows that 
when balance-of-payments problems emerged, differences in national vulnerability profiles 
were associated with different crisis responses and variation in the level of political conflict. 
When vulnerability to one type of adjustment strategy clearly dominated, adjustment occurred 
more swiftly and with less recourse to financing, and there was less political conflict about the 
appropriate crisis management. In contrast, where important parts of society exhibited a high 
level of vulnerability to any adjustment, the crisis management was very difficult. Here, the 
question how the crisis should best be addressed was politicized and very controversial, which 
is why the policy response was frequently characterized by financing and delay, a mix of both 
externally and internally oriented adjustment measures and conflictive crisis politics. 
However, a similar pattern emerged across all countries: Even though a majority of 
respondents felt that their situation had at least somewhat deteriorated in the course of the 
crisis, voters of the governing parties were privileged and were least negatively affected by 
the crisis. These results suggest that governments tried to implement those policies that were 
least painful to the economy at large and their constituencies in particular. Overall, the 
analysis thus demonstrates that differences in vulnerability profiles can strongly influence 
crisis politics in countries affected by balance of payments crises.  
 
3. Implications for Crisis Countries in the Eurozone 
What lessons can we draw from the Eastern European experience for the deficit countries of 
the eurozone, who have equally been experiencing substantial balance-of-payments problems 
during the euro crisis? At the outset of the crisis the extent of balance of payments problems 
in the EMU deficit economies were generally less pronounced than in the Eastern European 
 26 
economies.26 Although this should make the need for adjustment smaller, resolving the 
eurozone crisis has proven very difficult. As members of a monetary union, for whom 
external adjustment is officially not an option, all EMU crisis countries have embarked on a 
path of internal adjustment. Nonetheless, there has been substantial variation in crisis politics 
in these countries as well, with some countries successfully implementing far-reaching 
domestic reforms, and others experiencing significant political opposition to their reform 
plans. To what extent does this variation reflect differences in vulnerability profiles? More 
generally, how is crisis management different for countries within a monetary union? To 
answer these questions, the final part of this paper briefly compares the situation in the main 
EMU deficit countries  – Ireland, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain – to the situation 
in the Eastern European countries in the global financial crisis. I begin with a comparison of 
vulnerability profiles and government ideology, and then discuss the implications for policy 
responses, crisis politics, and distributive outcomes. 
In terms of vulnerabilities, EMU member states are exceptional in that their 
vulnerability to external adjustment, i.e., euro exit, is exceedingly high. This high 
vulnerability not only results from the economic and political fallout that a euro exit woud 
generate because of the potential loss of EU membership and the financial havoc this step 
would likely create across the eurozone. External adjustment in these economies would also 
imply the reintroduction of a national currency, creating substantial indirect foreign-currency 
risk in these countries.27 The vast majority of debt in eurozone countries is denominated in 
euro, and the denomination of these debts would likely constitute one of the most contentious 
topics of negotiations concerning an exit from EMU. It is not unlikely that foreign debt in 
euro would remain denominated in euro, which would vastly increase the debt burden for 
individuals, firms, and banks in countries with a new, depreciating currency. For this reason, 
all euro-denominated external debt in the EMU deficit countries carries the risk of turning the 
substantial levels of external debt into foreign-currency denominated debt. All this makes all 
eurozone economies extremely vulnerable to a breakup of the monetary union, reflected in 
figure 4 as a uniform coding for all EMU member states as highly vulnerable to external 
adjustment. Whereas vulnerability to external adjustment does not significantly vary across 
EMU crisis countries, their vulnerability to internal adjustment does vary considerably – 
although it is high across the board. Reflecting inflexible labor markets, high unemployment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 An average current account deficit of 7.7%, compared with an average of 13.7% in the eight Eastern 
European countries. 
27 Moreover, most EMU crisis economies (with the exception of Ireland) are less export-oriented than most 
Eastern European states, hence further limiting the beneficial potential positive impact of a devaluation. 
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rates, and a strained fiscal situation, Greece and Portugal score highest, although Spain 
quickly joined these two countries after its housing bubble burst and the fiscal situation 
dramatically deteriorated in the wake of several bank rescues.28 Ireland, France, and Italy 
show a somewhat lower vulnerability to internal adjustment going into the crisis, but 
nonetheless one that is significantly higher than that of the Eastern European countries that 
succeeded with their path of internal adjustment. Moreover, figure 4 shows that on average, in 
ideological terms the governments presiding over crisis management in the EMU countries 
tend much more towards the center of the political spectrum than the rather right-leaning 
governments in the Baltic states and Bulgaria. Internally-oriented reforms such as 
productivity-enhancing structural reforms, cuts in public spending, and tax increases tend to 
be unpopular policies amongst these governments’ voters. 
 
Figure 4: Vulnerability profiles and government ideology in Eastern Europe and EMU 
deficit countries 
 
Note: Index on external adjustment for Eastern European countries see figure 2. Vulnerability to internal 
adjustment is a additive index combining the variables unemployment, wage rigidity, fiscal deficit, and 
regulatory burden, standardized across all 13 countries in the sample (data sources see above). Government 
ideology is measured as the average of the left-right score for each party in government, weighted by its cabinet 
seat share (based on ParlGov database, Döring and Manow 2013).  	  	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Figure 4 is based on data for 2007 for all countries. If data for 2009 is used for the EMU crisis countries, 
vulnerability to internal adjustment is substantially higher, with Greece and Spain topping the list. 
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Overall, this very rough analysis paints a rather depressing picture, because it suggests 
that the main EMU deficit countries exhibit the difficult vulnerability profile of high 
vulnerabilities to any adjustment – both in the aggregate and in terms of government 
constituencies. In contrast to the Baltic and Bulgarian experience, who managed to implement 
immense internal adjustment without major public opposition, this implies that implementing 
such a strategy should be much more difficult for EMU policymakers. The painful and drawn-
out reform process in these countries and the strong reliance on external financing in the form 
of bailouts and growing Target2 balances attests to these difficulties. Moreover, this 
vulnerability profile suggests that political conflict and political instability are likely to be 
high, especially in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. This is indeed the case: incumbents have been 
punished electorally, support for radical parties has increased and protest politics has become 
more prevalent in the wake of these crises (e.g., Bosco and Verney 2012; van Gent et al. 
2013). Despite the lareg fallout from the crisis, however, we would also expect that well-
entrenched groups and the core constituencies of the governing parties should be least hurt by 
the crisis. The fact that less politically active groups (such as young people) have borne the 
brunt of adjustment in most countries, whereas structural reforms aimed at dismantling long-
standing privileges of certain groups have stalled, are in line with this expectation. Overall, 
then the experience of the euro crisis squares with the predictions for countries generated 
from this paper’s argument.  
At the same time, the fact that these countries operate within a monetary union 
changes the situation in two key respects: First, whereas financing only tends to be a 
temporary option for most countries, the larger context of EMU and the EU more generally at 
least theoretically allows for more permanent forms of external financing through intra-EMU 
or intra-EU transfers. The discussions about fiscal union, an EU-wide unemployment benefits 
scheme, and “intra-EU solidarity” more generally attest to this possibility and it is likely that 
these discussions will intensify if the crisis persists. Second, deficit countries within a 
monetary union can try to lower their adjustment burden by convincing surplus countries to 
share carrying the burden, for example by accepting higher rates of inflation or a more active 
stimulation of domestic demand. So far, the deficit countries have not been very successful in 
inducing significant adjustment in surplus countries, although the ECB’s recent ultra-loose 
monetary policy can be interpreted as a first step in this direction. The significant financial 
interlinkages within the monetary union give deficit countries a certain clout and can explain 
why they have been rather successful in generating external financial help (although no debt 
relief and no adjustment) from surplus countries. Nonetheless, the fact that all EMU countries 
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share a rather problematic vulnerability profile does suggest that the reform process will 
continue to be a drawn-out, painful, and politically costly process. 
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